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Situation I. Neutral Duties., the Passage of Belligerent 
Warships in Neutral Territorial Waters., and the Right 
of Belligerents to Use Force to Remedy Violation of 
Neutrality. 
The following hypothetical International Law Situation was 
presented to the students of the Naval War College as a part 
of one of their Operational Problems. See figure 1 for illustration 
of the Situation. 
THE SITUATION 
State A and thirteen other states are members of the United 
Nations and of a Defense Pact organized under Article 51 of the 
Charter. States X, Y and Z, also members of the United Nations, 
commenced without warning an armed attack on a member of 
the Defense Pact. In the Security Council, the Defense Pact States 
thereupon charged States X, Y and Z with aggression, but X, a 
permanent member thereof, "vetoed" the resolution condemning 
X, Y and Z as aggressors and calling for sanctions. The General 
Assembly was then convened under the Uniting For Peace Reso-
lution and passed, with a two-thirds majority, a resolution con-
demning the aggression and calling upon United Nations members 
for voluntary assistance to the victims of the aggression. State U, 
although a member of the United Nations, announced that she 
would maintain a position of neutrality. Despite the General 
Assembly resolution, X, Y and Z launched a major offensive. 
Fighting had been in progress for some months and nuclear 
weapons had been used, for tactical purposes, on both sides. 
J, a member State of the Defense Pact, had been ocupied by 
X, Y and Z in its northwest and northeast regions. The Defense 
Pact States commenced an amphibious attack on the northwest 
coast of J. X had assembled, in its port of Gr.anada, some 700 
miles from J, special weapons personnel and equipment for use in 
the northwestern part of J. The personnel and equipment were 
embarked on the "Lost Charm" for New Paris, a northwestern J 
port now in the hands of X. New Paris is near the area of 
amphibious operations, and one of the objectives of the operations. 
Instead of taking the usual and most direct route, X directed the 
commander of the "Lost Charm," an auxiliary of X flying X's 
service flag, to proceed through the X-coalition territorial waters 
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and thence through U's territorial waters, to arrive at J's border 
at nightfall, and thence to New Paris under cover of darkness. 
This route was eight hundred miles longer than the direct route 
from X's port of Granada to New Paris in J. The estimated time 
required for the "Lost Charm" to traverse U's territorial waters 
was 50 hours, in addition to the time required to transit the 
X coalitio'n's territorial waters. The excess time over the direct 
route may be estimated at 80 hours. 
The mission and location of the "Lost Charm" were discovered 
by the Defense Pact's intelligence just after that ship had entered 
the territorial waters of U. A's ambassador to U, on behalf of the 
Defense Pact, immediately informed U's Foreign Office of these 
facts and demanded that U either intern the "Lost Charm" or 
order the "Lost Charm" out of U's territorial waters. U, relying 
on the Altmark precedent in World War II, replied that it 
would not comply with either request. 
Problem: 
a. Has U violated its duties as a neutral in refusing to comply 
with A's demand on behalf of the Defense Pact? 
b. Are the Defense Pact States entitled to use force against the 
"Lost Charm" in U's territorial waters, if U is unable or unwill-
ing to comply with A's demand, and should have done so? 
Solution: 
a. U has violated its duties as a neutral in permitting an 
abusive use of its territorial waters that was not for bona fide 
purposes of navigation and was prejudicial to the security interests 
of the coastal state and to the interests of the Defense Pact as 
opposing belligerents. Such use is not the "mere passage" author-
ized by Article X of Hague Convention XIII. 
b. While every breach of neutral duties does not authorize 
forceful counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent, in the case of 
such a grave violation as the instant Situation presents, the 
Defense Pact States were legally entitld to use force to prevent 
irremediable injury arising from U's breach of neutrality. 
NOTES 
The Altmark Case 
The hypothetical situation is of course essentially similar to 
the Altmark case which took place in Norwegian territorial waters 
in 1940. A general and readable account of the incident is The 
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Altmark Affair, by Frischauer and Jackson (The Macmillan 
Compa'ny, New York, 1955). The essential facts of that case were 
briefly summarized in Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 
Vol. VII, pp. 568-69, ( 1943), as follows: 
"The German steamer, Altmark, previously a mer-
chant tanker but at the time in question a naval auxiliary, 
armed with anti-aircraft guns and flying the German 
official service flag as a vessel used for public pur-
poses, entered Norwegian territorial waters on February 
14, 1940 with the intention of skirting the Norwegian 
and Swedish coasts until she reached a German port. 
She brought from the South Atlantic as prisoners 299 
British seamen who had been taken from vessels sunk by 
the German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee. Shortly after 
entering Norwegian waters she was hailed by a Nor-
wegian naval vessel which inspected her papers. At that 
time the captain of the Altmark said that the ship was 
on her way from Port Arthur, Texas, to Germany. The 
next day another Norwegian naval vessel sought to in-
spect her but was refused the right. Among other ques-
tions, the captain of the Altmark was then asked whether 
there were on board any persons belonging to the armed 
forces of another belligerent or seamen resident in or 
nationals of another belligerent country, and to these 
he answered 'No'. At this time it was learned that the 
Altmark had been using her wireless transmitter within 
Norwegian waters, but the captain said that he was 
unaware of any prohibition against this and thereupon 
ceased doing so. A Norwegian torpedo boat was escorting 
the Altmark, and a second joined them February 16. That 
day British naval and air forces approached, and the 
British commanding officer suggested that the Altmark 
be taken under joint British and Norwegian escort to 
Bergen for full examination, but the Norwegian com-
mander refused. The Norwegian authorities apparently 
remained unaware that prisoners were aboard the 
Altmark. British destroyers which had entered Nor-
wegian territorial waters retired upon the protest of 
Norwegian officials but that 'night they forced the Alt-
mark into Joesing Fjord. While the Norwegian torpedo 
boats stood by, forces from the British destroyer Cossack 
boarded the Altmark, which had gone aground in the 
fjord., Fighting ensued in which seven Germans were 
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killed or died of wounds and one British national was 
wounded. The prisoners were rescued and taken aboard 
the Cossack, and the British forces departed from Nor-
wegian waters with the prisoners." 
Comparison of Facts in Situation and Altmark Case 
There are certain important differences between the facts of 
the hypothetical situation and the Alt?nark incident. The trans-
port of special weapons personnel and equipment is undoubtedly-
of a less "innocent" character, and more likely to provoke bel-
ligerent counter-action than the transport of prisoners. Moreover, 
with reference to question (b), the justification for the use of 
force has a stronger factual foundation in this Situation. Further-
more, there is no question involved in the Situation as to the legal 
status of captured merchant seamen. However, the avoidance by 
the Altmark, en route from the South Atlantic to Germany, of 
the English Channel and the British Isles by going via Icelandic 
waters and then passing through Norwegian territorial waters 
for over two days and more than 400 miles before the British 
attack, and contemplating a further passage of 200 miles in those 
waters was equally abnormal in route and duration. The basic 
legal question as to the legality of the passage is, therefore, essen-
tially unaffected by the factual differences. 
Opinions of Writers on Altmark Case 
The Altmark incident aroused controversy at the time, and dis-
cussion of it has continued among writers on international law. 
Shortly after the incident occurred, the following opinion was 
expressed in the Naval War College International Law Situations, 
1939, pp. 14-15: 
"The British Government and some international law-
yers charged that Norway had failed in its duties and 
that it should not have allowed the Alt/n~ark to transport 
prisoners along its coast. More careful examination of 
the situation, however, indicates that Norway had no 
obligation to halt the Altmark, to force it to leave, to 
intern it, or to release the prisoners." 
Following this opinion, there appeared an extensive quotation 
from the similar opinion of the late Professor Borchard of Yale 
University which had appeared in full in 34 American Journal of 
International Law at pages 289-294 (1940). The late Professor 
Hyde, in the Second Revised Edition (1945) of his International 
La~u, chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States, 
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concurred essentially in the same position. (Vol. III, p. 2340) . 
Hackworth, Vol. VII, p. 575, concludes his treatment of the in-
cident by quoting the opinion of the Naval War College, supra. 
Among foreign writers, Castren in The Present Law of War and 
Neutrality (Helsinki, 1954) discusses the question at pp. 515-517, 
and expresses doubt as to the validity of the British arguments 
in the rna tter. 
British writers, on the other hand, have come to the defense 
of the British position, particularly after the end of the war and 
in light of the published views of the American writers noted 
above. Dr. W. R. Bisschof, however, discussed the question before 
the Grotius Society in 1940, and first raised in the literature the 
issue of whether the Alt'mark's circuitous route and extended 
trip through the Norwegian territorial waters was not an abuse 
of neutrality and therefore not the "mere passage" permitted by 
Article X of Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (1907). ( (1940) 26 
Grotius Society Transactions, p. 67 et seq.) In Oppenheim, 
International Law, Vol. II (7th Ed., 1952, by Lauterpacht), the 
position is taken that prolonged use by a belligerent of neutral 
territorial waters for passage not dictated by the requirements of 
navigation and intended to escape capture is an illicit use of 
neutral territory which the neutral is under a duty to prevent 
(pp. 692-695). 
Without discussing the Altmark case in detail, Professor H. A. 
Smith in The Law and Custom of the Sea (2nd Ed., 1950), 
reached the same conclusion as a matter of general principle 
(pp. 148-153, esp. p. 152, n. 5). Colombos, in The International 
Law of the Sea (3rd Rev. Ed., 1954) reaches the same conclusion 
in a summary manner (pp. 510-511). The most extensive dis-
cussion of the Altmark case and the most thorough exploration 
of the legal issues involved is in Waldock, "The Release of the 
Altmark's Prisoners," (1947), 24 British Year Book of Inter-
national Law, pp. 216-238. Professor Waldock, Chichele Professor 
of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford, concludes that the 
Altmark's passage was unlawful. The details of his argument 
will be examined at a later stage. Professor Stone of Australia 
in his Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) expresses a 
similar opinion although differing somewhat in the details of 
his argument (pp. 394-5). 
Professor Telders of Leyden, The Netherlands, in "L'Incident 
de l' Altmark" (Revue Generale de droit international public, Vol. 
48 (1941-5), pp. 90-100) reaches the same general conclusion but 
his arguments differ substa'ntially from those previously referred 
~~- Starting with the view that the Altmark could not claim the 'I 
status of a warship but that Norway could have treated her as 1 
such for neurality purposes, Telders argues that there was no 
time limit on passage in Norway's regulations and that Norway, 
not having forbidden passage as it could have, had impliedly 
permitted it. He contends, further, that Article XII of Hague 
Convention XIII imposed no time limit, and that Article X 
authorized passage for purposes of transit, which is not restricted 
to 'necessary transit. Such passage is, moreover, not deprived 
of its innocent character by the sole fact that a warship is using 
the passage as an asylum as well. But he nonetheless concludes 
that the legality of the Altmark's position does not turn on the 
"passage" question because he argues that auxiliaries have no . 
right to transport prisoners. Furthermore, whatever the immunity 
of warships from search, he asserts that auxiliaries have no such 
immunity. Therefore, he believes that Norway had a duty to search 
the AltJnark; that its failure to do so was a breach of neutral 
duty; and that the British were justified on the basis of self-
protection in their exceptional intervention which did not exceed ' 
the limits of necessity. 
In addition to "The Altmark Affair," referred to previously 
as a good general account of the incident, the early official 
statements made by the British, German, and Norwegian Gov-
ernments may be found in Documents on International Affairs, 
"Nor~vay and the War" (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1941, pp. 33-38). In Norway, No. 1 (1950), Cmd. 8012, reprinted, 
infra, as Appendix I to this Situation, a White Paper issued by 
the British Foreign Office on August 15, 1950, the text of the final 
British Note of 15 March 1940, which reached Oslo shortly before 
the German invasion, was made available. This Note was the first 
time that the British raised the question of the compatibility of 
the passage with the privilege given by Article X of Hague Con-
vention XIII. Cmd. 8012 includes the texts of other correspondence 
between the two governments in the period between 17 February 
and 15 March 1940. In the recently published International Law 
Studies, 1955 (U.S. Naval War College, Vol. L, 1957), Professor 
Tucker discusses the Altmark case in some detail and, in general, 
agrees with the British position (221n, 236-239, 262n). 
Provisions of Hague Convention XIII-Other Texts 
Hague Convention XIII of 1907, Convention Concerning the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, is printed 
in full in Naval War College, International La1v Situations, 1908, 
at pp. 213-222, and in Appendix B to the Law of Naval Warfare 
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(Navy Department, 1955) . The text may also be conveniently 
found in 36 Stat. 2415, U.S.T.S. 545, and Malloy's Treaties, Vol. 
II, p. 2352. The status of the Convention as of 31 October 1955 
is given in State Department Publication No. 6346, page 203. 
Provisions particularly relevant to the discussion of the Situa-
tion are the following: 
ARTICLE I. "Belligerents are bound to respect the 
sovereign rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in 
neutral territory or neutral waters, from all acts which 
would constitute, on the part of the neutral Powers, 
which knowingly permitted them, a non-fulfillment of 
their neutrality. 
ARTICLE II. "All acts of hostility, including capture 
and the exercise of the right of visit and search, com-
mitted by belligerent vessels of war in the territorial 
waters of a neutral Power, constitute a violation of 
neutrality and are strictly forbidden. 
ARTICLE V. "Belligerents are forbidden to use neu-
tral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against 
their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless 
telegraph stations or a'ny apparatus for the purpose of 
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea. 
ARTICLE X. "The neutrality of a Power is not af-
fected by the mere passage through its territorial waters 
of ships of war or prizes belonging to belligerents. 
ARTICLE XII. "In the absence of special provisions 
to the contrary in the legislation of the neutral Power, 
belligerent ships of war are forbidden to remain in the 
ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said 
Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the 
cases covered by the present Convention. 
ARTICLE' XIII. "If a Power which has been informed 
of the outbreak of hostilities learns that a belligerent 
ship of war is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in 
its territorial waters it must notify the said ship to 
depart within twenty-four hours or within· the time 
prescribed by the local regulations. 
ARTICLE XXV. "A neutral Power is bound to exercise 
such .surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to 
prevent any violation of the provisions of the above 
Articles in its ports or roadsteads, or in its waters." 
Although the Convention was not technically in force in World 
War II because certain of the belligerents, including the United 
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Kingdom, were not parties (see Article XXVIII), it has been 
generally recognized that the provisons of the Convention as a ; 
whole constituted an expression of binding customary interna-
tional law on the subject. II Oppenheim, supra, pp. 234-236, 694 ' 
n. 1; Law of Naval Warfare, supra, Ch. 2, n. 7, and Ch. 4, n. 18; 
Stone, supra, p. 391, n. 62. Before discussing the critical ques-
tions of interpretation that arise out of the ambiguities of the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, reference may be made 
to comparable statements of the applicable law. The Harvard 
Draft Convention o'n Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval 
and Aerial War provides in Article 25 as follows: 
"A neutral State has no duty to prevent the passage of 
a belligerent warship through its territorial waters." 
(American Jou;rnal of International Law, Vol. XXXIII, 
Supplement, Part II, p. 179, and Comment, p. 421 
(1939)). [Quoted with the permission of the Harvard 
Law School.] 
In the Comment that follows at page 422, citation above, this 
wording is said to embody the substance of Article X of Hague 
Convention XIII and it is asserted to be a statement of the 
international law on the subject in force at that time. 
Law of Naval Warfare (Department of the Navy, 1955), pro-
vides as follows in Section 443a: 
"a. Passage Through Territorial Sea. A neutral state 
may allow the mere passage of warships, or prizes, of 
belligerents through its territorial sea.22 " 
Interpretative Footnote 22 to Section 443 reads in part as 
follows: 
"* * * Thus, the 'mere passage' that may be granted 
to belligerent warships through neutral territorial waters 
must be of an innocent nature, in the sense that it must 
be incidental to the normal requirements of navigation 
and not intended in any way to turn neutral waters into 
a base of operations. In particular, the prolonged use of 
neutral waters by a belligerent warship either for the 
purpose of avoiding combat with the enemy or for the 
purpose of evading capture, would appear to fall within 
the prohibition against using neutral waters as a base 
of operations. * * *" 
The International Law Commission's final Report on the Law 
of the Sea7 adopted at its Eighth Session (1956), deals with the 
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right of Innocent Passage in Part I, Section III. The Report is 
reprinted in full, infra, Part II, Section 11,A,2. Although the 
International Law Commission's work is devoted to the law of 
the sea in time of peace, their formulations on this subject are 
valuable for the wartime situation as well, in view of the close 
connection between the wartime rules and the rules in peace-
time, and the relevance of the peacetime standard to the inter-
pretation of Article X, discussed, infra. 
Article 15, paragraph 3, defines innocent passage as follows: 
"3. Passage is innocent so long as the ship does not use 
the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to 
the security of the coastal State or contrary to the pres-
ent rules, or to other rules of international law." 
Article 16, paragraph 1, in defining the duties of the coastal 
State, states that it "must not allow the said sea to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States." In Article 17, defining 
the rights of protection of the coastal State, paragraph 1 authorizes 
said State "to protect itself against any act prejudicial to its 
security or to such other of its interests as it is authorized to 
protect under the present rules and other rules of international 
law." Paragraph 3 authorizes the coastal State to suspend passage 
temporarily in definite areas if essential for protection of the 
rights in paragraph 1. Paragraph 4 forbids suspension of passage 
through straits "normally used for international navigation be-
tween two parts of the high seas." Article 18 defines the duties 
of foreign ships during their passage. Articles 15, 16, 17, and 
18 apply to ALL vessels. 
Articles 24 and 25 are applicable to warships. Article 24 reads 
as follows: 
"1. The coastal State may make the passage of war-
ships through the territorial sea subject to previous au-
thorization or notification. Normally it shall grant inno-
cent passage subject to the observance of the provisions 
of articles 17 and 18." 
Article 25 authorizes the coastal State to require warships, not 
observing its regulations after request to do so, to leave the 
territorial sea. 
In addition to the various texts referred to above, a high judi-
cial interpretation of the meaning of innocent passage in a 
different context is of interest as a basis for comparison. 
In the Corfu Channel case (Merits) (International Court of 
Justice Reports, 19491 pp. 4-38), the Court held that ·warships 
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have a right of "innocent passage" in time of peace through 
straits used for international navigation (p. 28). The Court was · 
also of the opinion that the straits did not have to be a necessary ; 
route 'but merely one used for international navigation. Although 
the passage of British warships through the Corfu Channel was 
also designed to test the Albanian attitude in view of a previous 
illegal firing by Albania, and to demonstrate force, the Court 
held that, under all the circumstances, the "mission," and the 
1nanner of carrying it out did not deprive the passage of its 
innocent character (pp. 30-32). (The Judgment of the Court is 
reprinted in Naval War College, International Law Documents, 
1948-49, pp. 108-156. The points discussed are to be found at 
pages 142-148). 
"Mere Passage" 
The principal legal issue that arises in question (a) of the 
Situation is whether the duration, route and mission of the "Lost 
Charm" can be co'nsidered "mere passage" through U's terri-
torial waters, or an abuse of this privilege. This inquiry in turn 
requires the interpretation of Hague Convention XIII, and 
particularly Article X thereof. In the Altmark case, the early 
discussion by the Governments involved and the writers as well, 
\Vas largely directed to the right to search the Altmark and the 
lawfulness of transporting the prisoners. The British Note of ' 
15 March 1940, reprinted in Appendix I, infra, first published 
in 1950, and the British writers previously referred to, empha-
sized the "mere passage" question. Consequently, the discussion 
of the Situation will necessarily consider the arguments advanced 
on this aspect of the Altmark case. 
Article X taken alone is ambiguous. It becomes even more so 
when read in the light of the Hague Convention XIII as a 
whole. On the one hand, the Convention is designed to prohibit 
belligerent activities of a hostile nature in neutral ports and 
waters. On the other hand, there are numerous exceptions which 
permit belligerents to use neutral ports and waters as an asylum. 
Furthermore, several of the provisions give the neutral great di$-
cretion in defining its obligations under the Convention. 
The general principle is clear : that belligerents are bound to 
refrain from acts of hostility in neutral territory. What has been 
persistently troublesome, however, is the precise scope of the 
subsidiary principle expressed in Article V that neutral ports and 
waters shall not be used as a base of naval operations. Practice ' 
in the nineteenth century never resolved this problem and the ~ 
provisions of Hague Convention XIII did not succeed in formulat-
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ing an agreed and authoritative interpretation of this principle. 
See, for discussion, Hyde, supra, Vol. III, pp. 2249-2253 ; Stone, 
supra, pp. 392-395. 
Neutrals are obligated to deny any privilege of passage' to bel-
ligerents over the land territory or through the airspace of a 
neutral. It is now generally agreed that a neutral may, if it chooses, 
forbid passage through its territorial waters as well. See Jessup, 
Th1e Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurdisdiction, pages 
120-121; Law of Naval Warfare, supra, Ch. 4, n. 22; Stone, supra, 
p. 395; II Oppenheim, supra, p. 693. When Hague Convention 
XIII was drafted, however, there was no such general agreement 
that a neutral could forbid passage through territorial waters. 
Many States argued that there was such a rule. The British in-
sisted that there was a RIGHT of innoce'nt passage. The British 
Delegation to the 1907 Hague Conference was the original proposer 
of the substance of Article X, and seemed to view "mere passage" 
as meaning innocent or inoffensive passage in the interests of 
normal navigation as in peacetime. Article X, as adopted, was 
in essence a formula for leaving this controversy in an unsettled 
status. By not adopting the rule of complete exclusion, the neutral 
was given the option of permitting "mere passage'' in the interests 
of navigation rather than enforcing strict neutrality as neutrals 
are obligated to do under the land and air rules. See A. P. Higgins, 
The Hague Peace Conferences (1909), pp. 467-468. 
It is assumed for present purposes that State U has made no 
regulations on the subject with respect to either Article X or XII. 
The most reasonable interpretation of the Hague Convention as a 
statement of customary international law is thus the principal 
issue. Although, as stated, Article X is ambiguous in itself, it is 
first necessary to discuss the ambiguities in the relation of Article 
X to other Articles of the Convention. Article V forbids the use 
of neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations by 
belligerents against their adversaries. Article XII provides that 
in the absence of special legislation by the neutral, as assumed in 
this Situation, belligerent warships are not permitted "to remain 
in" the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters for more than 
twenty-four hours, "except in the cases covered by the present 
Convention." What is the relation of these Articles to Article X, 
which, in substance, states that a Power's neutrality is not com-
promised by the "mere passage" ("simple passage" in the French 
Text) of warships through its territorial waters? 
Waldock, supra, at page 235, argues that "passage" is covered 
by the twenty-four hour rule of Article XII; that a circuitous 
route to evade attack was not "mere passage" within Article X 
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but the use of the neutral waters for naval operations contrary 
to Article V, or alternatively, if Article V was not violated, use 
for refuge was not "mere passage" within Article X, and there-
fore passage is restricted to twenty-four hours by Article XII. 
These summarized conclusions of Professor Waldock do not do 
justice to his detailed argument, which may be briefly stated as 
follows: The Norwegian Neutrality Rules of 1938 (Vol. 32, 
American Journal of International Law, Supplement, 1938, pp. 
154-158) purport to restate the Hague rules. Although they dQ 
not refer specifically to the duration of passage, they could not 
enlarge Article X which is customary international law. Article 
X, being silent, leaves the time question open. The question under 
Article XII is whether "remain" confines the twenty-four hour 
rule to stops or applies to every entry. Article XIII strengthens the 
argument for the twenty-four hour rule. There is no support for 
more than twenty-four hours in Norway's regulations, nor for i 
Norway's distinction between passage after a stop and passage 
without a stop. The Pan-American General Declaration of Neu-
trality of 1939 said that belligerent warships may remain no more 
than twenty-four hours in ports and waters with no mention of 
passage (34 American Journal of International Law, Supple-
ment, 1940, p. 10). The United States Proclamation of 5 September 
1939 (Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1939, p. 
123) made no exception for passage and the special rules for the 
Canal Zone (Ibid., p. 139) make this position even clearer. Despite 
British championship of innocent passage, her 1912 regulations 
adopted the twenty-four hour rule with no mention of passage. 
Therefore, Norway's contention of no time limit is doubtful and 
contrary to the natural meaning of the Convention and tha regula-
tions and interpretations of states. 
Moreover, Waldock's argument continues, whatever the time 
limit, passage is restricted to "mere passage," which means liberty 
of transit incident to normal navigation, and for that purpose and 
not to gain an advantage. Any other view invites abuse and pro-
vokes hostilities. An abnormal course of extended duration is not 
"innoce'nt." The use of Norway's waters as a protected corridor 
is the use as a base of operations contrary to Article V. Article 
XII admittedly permits asylum under the twenty-four hour rule ' 
but is inconsistent with modern standards of neutral duty, and 
the trend in the practice of states is to restrict asylum, citing ; 
Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1939, p. 44, on 
treatment of warships AFTER entry. Even though Article XII 
was still valid in 1940 as a statement of customary law, it is not ' 
the same as indefinite passage through territorial waters, and . 
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abnormal passage is not permitted by Article X. The use of 
Norway's territorial waters as a protected corridor vvas an issue 
in World War I. Norway closed her waters to submarines in 1916. 
Both Great Britain and the United States protested alleged viola-
tions of this prohibition and urged Norway to mine her waters, 
which she did in 1918. Therefore, Norway knew of these views 
concerning the use of her territorial waters as a protected corridor. 
Professor W aldock then concludes as summarized, supra. 
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra, pp. 694-5 and 694, footnote 1, 
argues that the permission of passage is limited by the overriding 
principle of preventing neutral waters from becoming a base for 
belligerents, and that a circuitous route not required by normal 
navigation and used as a means of escape is illicit. It is asserted 
that the provisions under reference can be reconciled by treating 
Article X as permitting passage beyond the twenty-four hours of 
Article XII, so long as the passage does not contravene Article V 
by turning the waters into a base of operations. Bisschof, supra, 
on the other hand, like W aldock, regards Article XII as setting a 
twenty-four hour limit to any passage under Article X. Professor 
Stone, supra, pp. 394-5, follows Lauterpacht's Oppenheim on this 
question but would require more in the way of circuity and degree 
of abuse. Neither Hyde nor Borchard, supra, really discuss this 
issue. Smith, supra, p. 152, Note 5, regards the question of whether 
passage under Article X is subject to the twenty-four hour rule 
of Article XII as debatable, and believes it is probably up to the 
neutral to define the time limit under its power to do so granted 
in Article XII. Castren, supra, recognizes the question of inter-
pretation as doubtful but is inclined to regard Article XII as 
imposing no time limit on passage under Article X. 
Telders, supra, considers that neither Article XII nor the Con-
vention as a whole impose any time limit on passage but does not 
discuss the bearing of Article V on the question. The British Note 
of 15 March 1940, Appendix I, infra, takes the position that 
Article X does not incorporate the 24-hour limit of Article XII 
but that Article X governs the time limit indirectly by the nature 
of the innocent passage which it permits. Furthermore, the Note 
contends that, although Article XII is not controlling as to time, 
it serves to refute any contention that no time limit exists since 
it applies also to territorial waters subject to the innocent passage 
permitted by Article X. Finally, as noted supra, the La~v of Naval 
Warfare in its interpretative footnote 22 treats Article X as 
· modified by the prohibition of Article V. Interpretative footnote 
23 treats the question of whether the 24-hour rule of Article XII 
limits the duration of passage under Article X as unsettled but 
18 
expresses the op1n1on that, if it does not, then passage under 
Article X must be limited to the normal requirements of naviga-
tion. 
While] admittedly, the interpretation of the relationship between 
Articles V, X and XII in the light of the Convention as a whole is 
controversial, it is believed that the most reasonable interpretation 
is to regard "mere passage" under Article X as NOT limited by the 
24-hour rule of Article XII. However, the presence and wording 
of Article XII help to give meaning to the privilege of "mere-
passage" in Article X, as discussed hereafter. Furthermore, the 
most probable interpretation of Article X, suggested infra, quali-
fies the privilege of passage given thereby. Finally, "mere passage" 
in Article X must also be restricted by the prohibitions of Article 
V against using territorial waters as a base of naval operations 
and by the generalized restrictions of Articles I and II and the 
Convention as a whole against using neutral territory for hos-
tilities. 
With. this interpretation of the relationship between the Articles, 
we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the meaning of 
"mere passage" in Article X. What has been said so far suggests 
that Article X can only be considered in the context of the Con-
vention as a whole. It has already been indicated that Article X 
was a formula that left previous differences of opinion unsettled. 
It was a compromise in that sense between the view that neutrals 
could exclude passage altogether, and the British view that there 
was a RIGHT of innocent passage for warships in wartime similar 
to the peacetime right of merchant vessels. 
"Mere passage" in Article X can not be given a precise textual 
meaning. The legislative history provides no conclusive inter-
pretation. The use of the qualifying word "mere" indicates some 
limitation on passage was intended. The British who introduced 
the phrase into their draft of the Article indicated that innocent 
passage in the peacetime sense was what they had in mind. Any 
meaning given to the phrase is necessarily an interpretation. What 
is the most reasonable one in the light of its history and t4e 
purpose it was inte·nded to serve? Treating the question as one of 
defining what is meant by "innocent passage" in the peacetime 
sense is a .step in the interpretation of "mere passage." 
The introduction of "innocent passage" in the peacetime sense 
as an analogy for use in interpretation is fundamentally am-
biguous. It can not be transferred literally into the wartime situ-
ation. The wartime trilateral relations between opposing bel-
ligerents and a neutral coastal state are essentially different 
in kind and degree from the bilateral relations of a flag-state 
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and a coastal state in peacetrme. Nevertheless, the peacetime 
analogy serves to indicate the type of passage that belligerents 
were willing to allow neutrals to grant. The type of passage con-
templated is limited by two basic criteria. It must be an innocent 
passage for bona fide purposes of navigation rather than for 
escape or asylum. The passage must also be innocent in the sense 
that it does not prejudice either the security interests of the 
coastal state, or the interests of the opposing belligerent in pre-
venting passage beyond the type agreed to in Article X. A passage 
that increased the burden of surveillance or the likelihood of em-
broiling the neutral in hostilities would certainly prejudice the 
security interests of the neutral coastal state. Any passage that 
was prejudicial to other legitimate interests of the coastal state 
would warrant action by the coastal state but the coastal state 
would be under no duty since the additional interest of the op-
posing belligerent would not be involved. By virtue of these sug-
gested requirements, the belligerents are entitled to have passage 
so confined, and the neutral is under a duty to so limit the 
privilege. 
Such an interpretation is essentially in accord with the views 
of Lauterpacht, Stone, and Waldock. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, 
supra, II, p. 694, n. 1, and p. 695 ; Stone, supra, pp. 394-5, and n. 
83,p.394;Waldock,supra,pp.232-235. 
The first of these criteria, that of passage for bona fide naviga-
tional purposes, presents difficulties in itself. Suggestions that it 
means "normal" navigation practices raise problems as to the 
sense in which "normal" is used. Abnormal routes may still be 
bona fide ones. Nevertheless, extremely circuitous routes suggest 
possible bad faith. Moreover, motivations of escape or asylum 
make clear the purpose is not for navigation. 
With respect to the second criterion, it is believed that a passage 
by a belligerent that imposes special burdens of surveillance on 
the neutral and increases the likelihood of involving the neutral 
in hostilities with the opposing belligerent could not be "innocent" 
because it is prejudicial both to the security interests of the coastal 
state and to the interests of the opposing belligerent. This 
criterion would certainly encompass the use of neutral territorial 
waters as a protected corridor for purposes of avoiding capture 
or attack. Such a use might not reach the extent of employing 
such waters as a base for naval operations within the meaning 
of Article V, which certainly provides the outer limit to the rea-
sonableness of the passage. In view of the ambiguity of Article 
V's prohibition against use as a base of naval operations referred 
to, supra, and the consequent doubt vvhether use as an asylum is 
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included in that prohibition, the interpretation .suggested for 
"mere passage" in Article X gives it a meaning consistent with 
the Convention as a whole. Article XII permits a twenty-four 
hour "stay," including use as an asylum, but, as previously in-
dicated, it imposes no direct time limit on passage. Article X, 
while having no time limit, confers a special but limited privilege 
of passage by confinng it to a passage for bona fide navigational 
purposes and one that is also innocent in not being prejudicial to 
the security interests of the coastal state or the interests of the op..: 
posing belligerent. Article V applies to both "stay" and "passage" 
and prohibits either if it reaches the point of use as a base for 
naval operations. 
It seems most likely, therefore, that "innocent passage" in 
peacetime of territorial waters as an international highway was 
intended as a standard in the sense indicated above. What effect 
does the duration of the passage have on its legality? It has already 
been stated that the twenty-four hour rule of Article XII is not 
believed to be a direct legal limitation. There would seem to be 
no maximum time limit provided that the passage itself is "in-
nocent." Duration beyond twenty-four hours is relevant only in 
its bearing on the question of whether the passage is ''innocent." 
In the light of this interpretation of "passage" in Article X, 
does the "mission" of the ship furnish a further qualification of 
this limited privilege? It was strongly argued in the Altmark case · 
that there was nothing wrongful per se in transporting prisoners. 
Whatever the merit of this co·ntention, it would be unwarranted 
to claim that the nature of the "mission'' has no bearing on the 
innocence of the passage. If the "mission" by its nature is pre-
judicial to the security interests of the coastal state or the interests 
of the opposing belligerent, either by increasing the burden of 
surveillance or by increasing the likelihood of hostilities, it would 
be another relevant factor in making that determination. A 
fortiori, if the "mission" by its nature makes use of the waters 
as a base of naval operations, it would be a violation of Article V 
as well as Article X. 
Application to the Present Situation 
The route, purpose, and mission of the "Lost Charm'' were not 
for purposes of bona fide navigation and were clearly prejudicial 
to the security interests of U, the neutral and coastal state, and 
to the interests of the Defense Pact as opposing belligerents. The 
lo·nger duration of the voyage, and the abnormality of the route, 
while neither would be decisive in itself, were relevant to the 
total assessment of the character of the passage. The "mission" , 
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was so clearly provocative and so obviously a military function 
that it constituted by itself a violation of Article V, and therefore 
exceeded without question the limited privilege of ''innocent" 
passage given by Article V. The passage was designed to make 
use of U's territorial waters as a shelter for naval operations. 
Passage in circumstances so overwhelming in their impact as 
these are should not be considered as the "mere passage" permitted 
by Arti~le X. Such a passage is a flagrant abuse of U's neutrality. 
By permitting such a pasage, U violated its duties as a neutral. 
Application to the Altmark Case 
The factual differences in the Altmark case have been noted, 
supra. Admittedly, the ''mission" was less provocative. The ab-
normal route and the duration of the use of Norwegian territorial 
waters would not in themselves be decisive. It is debatable whether 
the total circumstances can be regarded as the use of the waters as 
a base for naval operations within Article V, in the light of the 
ambiguous history of that provision. It was, however, the use of 
Norway's territorial waters as a means of escape and protection. 
The passage, considered in its entirety, constituted an employment 
of the neutral's territorial waters in a manner that was pre-
judicial to the security interests of the coastal state and the inter-
ests of the opposing belligerent. It increased the burden of 
surveillance and the likelihood of counteraction. Such a passage 
must be regarded as an abuse of Norway's neutrality, and can 
not be justified by the limited privilege of ''mere passage" given 
by Article X of Hague Convention XIII. 
Right of Search 
The present Situation does not require a discussion of the 
prisoner question which was an issue in the Altmark case and 
which was thoroughly debated by many of the writers cited pre-
viously. Although the search issue is not directly raised by the 
facts given in question (a) of the Situation, the right of the 
neutral to make a search was also thoroughly argued in the 
Altmark case, and is implicit in the Situation. Both Borchard and 
Hyde, supra, argued that there was no right to search a public 
ship such as the Altmark, except possibly to see if there was com-
pliance with Norway's neutrality regulations (Borchard). Telders, 
supra, on the other hand, argued that an auxiliary such as the 
Altmark was not immune from .search. Assuming, arguendo, that 
there is normally immunity from search, the position of Waldock 
(supra, pp. 221-222), that the neutral's duty to enforce its obliga-
tions under the Convention consitutes an exception to this im-
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munity, is more consistent with the spirit of the Convention, a'nd 
a more workable rule if neutrality is to be preserved. Lauter-
pacht's Oppenheim, supra, (p. 730, n. 4), concedes that Norway 
had no duty to search for the prisoners in order to release them, 
but argues that search would be relevant in determining whether 
the passage was "innocent," and therefore impliedly supports 
Waldock's position. The British Government Note of 15 March 
1940, reprinted, infra, Appendix I, argued vigorously that Norway 
had an obligation to determine whether the passage was lawful, 
and that failure to make a search for this purpose was a violation 
of neutrality. 
State U as a Neutral Mentb er of the United Nations 
U, although a Member of the United Nations, declared her 
intention to be neutral. Despite the inconsistency between the 
collective security scheme of the Charter and traditional neutral-
ity, it has been asserted that a status of neutrality for a Member 
on the facts of this Situation is technically possible. It has been 
factually possible, as Korea demonstrated. It is debatable whether 
it is legally possible in view of the obligation of Members under : 
Article 2 ( 5) that: 
"All Members shall give the Unted Nations every as-
sistance in any action it takes in accordance with the 
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance 
to any state against which the United Nations is taking 
preventive or enforcement action." 
The "veto" prevented the United Nations from taking "action" 
in accordance with the original Charter scheme, and the recom-
mendations of the General Assembly, although morally persuasive, 
cannot be deemed legally binding even on Members. Consequently, 
it is permissible to contend that U was legally free to take the 
position she did. It is believed, however, that she would have been 
also legally justified if she had complied voluntarily with the rec-
ommendations. She had an imperfect right under Article 2 ( 5) ' 
to assist the collective action as well as the obligation not to give 
assistance to the States opposing the collective action. The right 
was "imperfect" in the sense that U and the Defense Pact's resort 
to force had not been authoritatively determined to be lawful by 
competent international authority. 
The writers generally are in accord with this position. The Law 
of Naval W a;rfare, supra, in Section 232, deals with the question 
and reads in part as follows : 
"Section 232. * * * * These obligations of the mem-
her states, incompatible with the status of neutrality and 
with the principle of impartiality, come into existence 
only if the Security Council fulfills the functions dele-
gated to it by the Charter. If the Security Council is 
unable to fulfill its assigned functions, the members may, 
in case of a war, remain neutral and observe an attitude 
of strict impartiality.19 " 
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In footnote 19, the opinion is expressed that the recommenda-
tions of the Generaly Assembly are not legally binding and there-
fore "neutrality and complete in1partiality both remain distinct 
possibilities." 
Stone in Legal Controls of International Conflict, supra, passim, 
reaches this conclusion and asserts that the non-participating 
Members in the Korean situation were neutrals (p. 382, n. 14). 
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra, pp. 647-652, reaches the same 
general conclusion, although believing that a men1ber in U's posi-
tion would have the right to discriminate against the aggressor. 
Lalive in "International Organization and Neutrality", (1947), 
24 British Year Book of International Law 72 at 77-84, discusses 
this possibility in a number of situations under the Charter, and 
concurs in the position taken above. Compare Taubenfeld in "In-
ternational Actions and Neutrality" (1953), 47 American Journal 
of International La~v 377-396, where the Korean situation is dis-
cussed, and the conclusion reached that neutrality is not legally 
tenable for a Iviember in· a "true" United Nations action (pp. 
390-395). Castren, supra, pp. 433-5, believes that a status of 
neutrality for a Member is possible despite Section 2 ( 5) of the 
Charter. 
Use of Force by a Belligerent to Redress Abuse of Neutrality 
It will now be assumed that the X-coalition's employment of the 
"Lost Charm" was a violation of U's neutrality and that U was 
obligated to either intern the "Lost Charm" or order it out of her 
territorial waters. Question (b) of the Situation raises the issue 
of whether the Defense Pact was entitled to use force in U's 
territorial waters to redress the breach of neutrality if U was 
unable or unwilling to do so. Since the facts of the Situation show 
that U, relying on the Altmark precedent, refused to comply with 
, the Defense Pact's request, the question of the Defense Pact's 
right to employ force against the ''Lost Charm" is directly raised. 
Article XXV of the Hague Convention, quoted supra, provides 
that a neutral is bound to exercise such surveillance "as the means 
at its disposal allow" to prevent violations of the Convention in 
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its waters. Articles III, VIII, and XXI, in referring to neutral 
duties of enforcement, also use the phrase ''as the means at its 
disposal allow" in defining the obligation. 
The facts stated in the Situation show a refusal to act, and do 
not therefore pose directly the issue of the use of force by a bel-
ligerent when the neutral is willing but unable to act for lack of 
adequate means at its disposal. Under these latter circumstances, 
there is no violation of neutral duty. Nevertheless, despite that 
fact and the quoted language of the Convention, the writers gen:-
erally take the view that the injured belligerent, under sufficiently 
extreme circumstances, is authorized to use force to prevent 
irremediable injury to itself. The belligerent's obligation not to 
take hostile measures in neutral waters is inapplicable in extreme 
cases not only when the neutral is unwilling to act but also when 
it is unable to do so. 
When, however, as in the Situation, the neutral is unwilling to i 
act even though able to do so, the neutral has breached its duty 
both under the Convention and under the general principles of 
customary international law. Here, too, under sufficiently extreme 
circumstances, the injured belligerent is authorized to use force 
to prevent irremediable injury to itself. The injured belligerent's 
normal remedy for such a breach of duty is to claim reparation 
through diplomatic channels. For anything less than a grave 
breach of duty, this is the only authorized remedy. The writers 
also agree, however, that the belligerent is justified in resorting 
to self-help under sufficiently extreme circumstances in which im-
mediate cessation of the violation would be the only adequate 
remedy. Whether the resort to self-help was justified will depend 
both on the importance of the interests involved and the factual · 
necessity for immediate action if irreparable injury is to be :. 
avoided. 
The Law of Naval Warfare, supra, after referring to the pro-
hibition of acts of hostility in neutral jurisdiction, goes on to 
provide as follows: 
"Section 441. * * * However, a belligerent is not for- ~ 
bidden to resort to acts of hostility in neutral jurisdiction 
against enemy troops, vessels, or aircraft making illegal 
use of neutral territory, waters, or air space, if a neutral 
state will not or cannot effectively enforce its rights 
against such offending belligerent forces. 21 " 
In footnote 21, the opinion is expressed that, despite the lan-
guage of Article XXV of the Hague Convention, it is recognized ~ 
that a belligerent has the right, as an extreme measure, to use ·1 
I 
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force against an enemy making illegal use of neutral territory, 
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to do so. 
Hyde, supra, although believing that the British were not justi-
fied in using force in the Altmark case, affirms that in extraor-
dinary circumstances the belligerent is justified in using force 
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to do so (Vol. III, pp. 
2337-2340). W aldock, supra, in defending the British action in 
the Altmark case, takes the position that any breach materially 
threatening the injured belligerent's interest is by its nature so 
serious that the principle of self-preservation justifies intervention 
in neutral waters, and that such right of intervention is now 
generally recognized, citing Hyde, supra. This right only accrues 
when the neutral is unable or unwilling to prevent the violation, 
citing Article XXV, supra. 
Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supr~a, in supporting the British 
action in the Altmark case, argues that in circumstances where 
reparation would be inadequate, resort to self-help is justified 
(Vol. II, p. 695, n. 1). Stone, supra, (p. 401 and note 117, p. 401) 
differs from Lauterpacht and Waldock. He argues that only in case 
of self,..preservation would self-help be justified, and does not be-
lieve that self-preservation was involved in the Altmark case, citing 
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu 
Channel case. In the Corfu Channel case (Merits), (1949), Inter-
national Court of Justice Reports, pp .34-5, the Court held that in-
tervention for the purpose of procuring evidence of violation of 
duty was an illegal use of force and that self-protection or self-help 
did not justify the action of the British Navy in the circumstances 
(Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1948-49, pp. 
151-152). Castren, supra, affirms the right of the injured bellig-
ere'nt to resort to self-help when the situation is serious, and the 
neutral is unable or unwilling to act ( p. 442). Telders, supra, ar-
gues that the British, not exceeding the limits of necessity, were 
fully justified in the Altmark case under international law, and 
supported not only by writers in general but by German doctrine as 
vvell (pp. 98-99). 
There is some dissent from this position. See Briggs, ·The Law 
of Nations (2nd Ed., 1952), p. 1039, and compare the Harvard 
Research Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States 
in Naval and Aerial War, 33 American Journal of International 
Law, Supp., 1939, Articles 6, 8, 23, and 24, and comments at pages 
247-249, 257-263 and 392-421. 
The question should be noted whether self-help in this Situation 
by the injured belligerents, being Members of the United Nations, 
would constitute a violation of the Charter in view of Article 2, 
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paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 51, which preserves the "inherent" 
right of self-defense. Paragraph 3 requires Members to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international ; 
peace is not endangered. Paragraph 4 reads as follows: 
"All Members shall refrain in their international re-
lations from threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations." 
Full discussion of this important issue will not be attempted 
here. In brief, it is believed that the use of force in the extreme 
circumstances of the Situation would still be justified as a measure 
of self-defense. In borderline situations, however, such as the 
Altmark, if the Charter had thus been applicable, the use of force i 
might be prohibited by the mandate of Article 2, paragraph 4. · 
Consequently, to some extent, the neutral's territory in a future 
war may theoretically receive additional protection from this . 
Charter provision. For further discussion, see W aldock, "The ; 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Inter-
national Law," Recueil des Cours, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 455-517, in 
which he considers the impact of the Corfu Channel case as well . 
as the provisions of the U. N. Charter on the lawful use of force ~ 
by individual states in international law. ' 
Application to Present Situation 
It has been seen that there is a general consensus that an in- . 
jured belligerent has the right to resort to self-help if the circum- • 
stances are sufficiently serious and the neutral is unable or : 
unwilling to intervene to redress the breach of neutrality. The 
presence of special weapons personnel and equipment on the "Lost 
Charm" with their proximity to an area of operations made 
immediate action imperative, and the normal diplomatic remedies 
useless. Since U had refused to act, the Defense Pact forces would 
be fully justified under international law and under the Charter 
in using force to stop the X-coalition's abuse of U's neutrality. 
The fact that the Defense Pact States were acting under a General 
Assembly Resolution, even though not legally binding, provides 
additional support. 
Application to Alt1nark Case 
On the facts of the Altmark case, the right of self-help pre- : 
sents a debatable question. As indicated previously, the writers 
have divided on the merits of the British intervention. Assuming . 
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for the purpose of this aspect of the case that Norway had 
violated its duties as a neutral, the legality of the British inter-
vention turns on whether the breach of neutrality was sufficiently 
serious to justify this extreme measure. Diplomatic redress would 
certainly have been inadequate under the circumstances. If Stone 
is correct that self-preservation is required, then intervention 
would not be justified. In view of the weaknesses of international 
society in providing adequate means for redressing wrongs, a 
rule permitting intervention on the ground of self-help on the 
facts in the Altm.ark case might be justified. Such a rule would 
be more in accord with the realities and more likely to insure the 
survival of the rules of neutrality. On the other hand, resort to 
self-help should be confined to the gravest circumstances. On moral 
and humanitarian grounds, the British intervention can be under-
stood and defended. It is difficult to say dogmatically that their 
intervention violated the law in force at the time. The thrust of 
the Charter provisions and the Corfu Channel case, however, sug-
gest that the use of force under such circumstances would no\v 
be illegal. In view of the weaknesses of international institutions 
previously mentioned, it may still be questioned whether such a 
conclusion is desirable. 
Student Comments 
The small student staff assigned to study and comment on the 
Situation concluded that the passage of the "Lost Charm" was not 
innocent and that self-preservation and self-help justified the use 
of force to end the violation of U's neutrality. The warlike nature 
of the "mission" was emphasized. The view was expressed that 
Hague Convention XIII needs reexamination in the light of 
modern weapons systems, which make necessary stricter measures 
to curb the advantages which may accrue to a belligerent in 
neutral waters. The right of self-preservation is more immediately 
involved. The passage of warships carrying materiel and per-
sonnel to a combat zone cannot be "innocent" and the neutral 
should be obligated to prohibit such transit if neutrality is to be 
preserved. · 
Adequacy of Convention XIII 
As suggested by the student staff comments, the Situation raises 
the question of the adequacy of I-Iague Convention XIII. Drawn 
up as it was in a period of comparative calm, and before the 
widespread violations of neutrality in the last two World Wars, 
it is inevitable that its provisions are no longer adequate for 
the conditions of modern warfare. Stone, supra, has dealt at 
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length with the contemporary crisis of neutrality and has stressed, ,1 
inter alia, the effect of the inability of neutrals to live up to their 
duties (Passim, and especially on Hague Convention XIII, pp. 
391-396, and Discourse 23, pp. 402-407). Professor Hyde argued 
convincingly the inadequacy of proclaiming the inviolability of 
neutral territory and then permitting belligerent uses thereof 
which inevitably inspired warlike activities therein. He suggested, 
therefore, that passage through neutral coastal waters "should, by 
general agreement, be greatly restricted, if not entirely forbid~ 
den" (Vol. III, p. 2312). 
Professor H. A. Smith, supra, suggests in general terms that 
neutrality as presently constituted is unlikely to survive in any 
great conflict involving most of the world but that it may continue 
to serve its traditional purpose in small wars (pp. 75-76). He 
points out that the survival of neutrality even under these cir-
cumstances will depend on the strictness with which it is ob-
served. He argues that the chances of such survival would be 
greatly enhanced if a general policy of exclusion by neutrals of , 
belligerent warships from their territorial waters were followed, 
as the Nether lands did in World War I. Consequently, sound 
policy should restrict as much as possible the facilities which 
belligerents can claim in neutral ports and waters. The right of ., 
"innocent passage" in this context is anomalous. He concludes 
that exclusion would be acceptable to belligerents, if territorial 
waters are restricted to the traditio'nal three miles (pp. 160-161). 
This last proviso of Professor Smith requires a brief discus-
sion of the effect that the decision by the International Court of : 
Justice in the Fisheries case, reprinted, infra, in this volume, 
and other current developments in national claims to more exten-
sive internal and territorial waters, documented, infra, in this vol-
ume, will have on the problem raised by the Situation. The Fish-
eries decision, by expanding the area of internal waters in which 
it has been customarily understood no right of innocent passage 
exists, and the similar effect of certain national claims, will 
restrict the sea space available to belligerent operations. It should 
be noted that the Inter'national Law Commission in its final Report 
on the Law of the Sea provided in Article 5, paragraph 3, that, 
where straight base lines, newly established, enclose as internal 
waters areas previously considered high or territorial seas, a 
right of innocent passage through such waters should be pre-
served whenever such waters have normally been used for in-
ternational traffic. Whether such an exception could now be im-
plied through such waters for the "mere passage" provided by 
Article X of Hague Convention XIII (1907) is very doubtful. 
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To the degree the decision -and other recent claims have the con-
sequence of extending the width of the territorial water belt itself, 
it will both restrict the sea space available to belligerent opera-
tions and broaden the area in which "innocent passage" is per-
mitted. Such an expansion will markedly increase the neutral's 
task of surveillance and similarly enhance the probabilities of 
belligerent abuse of the "mere passage" privilege. These considera-
tions, in turn, accentuate the danger of counteraction by an 
aggrieved belligerent. 
In view of these probable consequences, an extensive broaden-
ing of the territorial sea will probably prove unacceptable to 
belligerents and should give pause to neutrals themselves. It could 
lead, on the one hand, to the increased insistence of belligerents 
on the right of passage despite. the greater difficulties, and, on 
the other hand, to greater likelihood that neutrals would follow a 
policy of restricting or prohibiting innocent passage entirely. Such 
a policy of exclusion, suggested previously, would only be accept-
able to belligerents if the traditional limits of territorial waters 
are maintained, as Professor Smith has indica ted. 
Summary Conclusions 
The Problem Situation and the Altmark case both suggest the 
need for a more intensive study of t:he privilege of innocent 
passage through neutral territorial waters by belligerent warships. 
Whatever the differences of writers on the Altmark facts, it is 
clear that the provisions permitting "mere passage" are ambiguous 
and permit abuse, which in turn encourages the taking of forceful 
counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent. This can only lead to a 
breakdow·n in the maintenance of the rules of neutrality. To pre-
serve the institution of neutrality, a tightening of the rule, or, pre-
ferably, a rule of complete exclusion, (if present territorial water 
limits are maintained), would be desirable. The recent tendency 
to make claims to more extended internal and territorial waters 
makes the problem more urgent. Similarly, the development of 
the means of modern warfare requires greater strictness in the 
rule. Even under the existing rule, the use of an abnormal route 
of long duration for a warlike "mission" is not for bona fide pur-
poses of navigation and is prejudicial to the security interests of 
the coastal state and to the interests of the opposing belligerent. 
- Such use must therefore be regarded as a violation of the rule. 
While the legality of the use of force in extreme situations must 
be admitted, a strengthening of the rule would serve to lessen, 
and, if possible, prohibit resort to such measures. 
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Solution 
(a) U has violated its duties as a neutral in permitting an 
abusive use of its territorial waters that was not for bona fide 
purposes of navigation and was prejudicial to the security inter-
ests of the coastal state and to the interests of the Defense Pact 
as opposing belligerents. Such use is not the "mere passage" 
authorized by Article X of Hague Convention XIII. 
(b) While every breach of neutral duties does not authorize 
forceful counteraction by an aggrieved belligerent, in the case 
of such a grave violation as the instant Situation presents, the 
Defense Pact States were legally entitled to use force to prevent 
irremediable injury arising from U's breach of neutrality. 
APPENDIX I TO SITUATION I 
Correspondence between His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom and the Norwegian Government respecting the 
German Steamer Altmark. (London, 17th February-15th March 
1940. Norway No. 1 (1950), British Command Paper No. 8012.) 
NOTE. This correspondence, taken from British Command Paper No. 8012, 
printed in 1950, is reprinted below for convenient reference. The Document 
( Cmd. 8012) is British Crown copyright, and permission to reprint in this 
volun1e has been obtained from the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's 
Stationery Office through the courtesy of the British Foreign Office by a letter 
to the Editor dated 26 September 1956. The early official statements by the 
British, German, and Norwegian Governments have been available since 1941. 
See Documents on International Affairs, Norway and the War (Royal 
Institute of Intern&.tional Affairs, ( 1941), pp. 33-38). 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT 
IN THE UNITED I(INGDOM AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERN-
MENT RESPECTING THE GERMAN STEAMER "ALTMAR!(" 
London, 17th February-15th March, 1940 
FOREWORD 
The Altmark was, from the point of view of international law 
and practice, of considerable importance as a legal precedent. The 
incident has been dealt with by various distinguished publicists 
on international law but because the full correspondence has never 
been published they have not had all the necessary information 
before them in order fully to appreciate it from the legal point of 
view. Consequently, it is thought to be desirable, after consultation 
with the Norwegian Government, to publish the texts of the ex-
changes of 'notes which took place between the two Governments 
between 17th February and 15th March 1940. 
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No. 1 
Record of Conversation Between Viscount Halifax and Monsieur 
Colban 
Important 
I asked the Norwegian Minister to call this afternoon and in-
formed him that I thought his Government should be placed in 
possession of certain facts already known to us in connection with 
the liberation of the prisoners from the steamship Altmark. 
2. The British authorities had been in touch with this ship 
for some time. It was notorious that she had participated in the 
depredations of the Graf Spee, to which she had been acting as 
auxiliary. We had the best of reasons, confirmed by the British 
subjects taken off the Graf Spee and previously imprisoned in the 
Altmark, to believe that there were some three or four hundred 
British subjects aboard who had been living for weeks under in-
tolerable conditions. The Altmark was also credibly believed to 
possess offensive armaments. The record of this ship must have 
been well known to the Norwegian Government and in the view 
of His Majesty's Government it was incumbent on the Norwegian 
authorities, when she entered Bergen and requested passage 
through Norwegian territorial waters, to subject her to a 1nost 
careful search. 
3. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for full par-
ticulars as to how this search was conducted and what facts were 
discovered. Reports received by His Majesty's Government in-
dicated that the examination had been perfunctory, and in any 
case prisoners had not been discovered. On evidence received 
hitherto, it appeared to His Majesty's Government that the Nor-
wegian Government had failed in their duties as neutrals. It had 
been suggested to me that the result of the examination would 
have been such that the Nor"\vegian Government would have felt 
obliged to release the prisoners. His Majesty's Government would 
be glad to know what action the Norwegian authorities would 
have taken if the prisoners had been found. Surely they would 
either have released them or at any rate held them pending a full 
examination of the position. 
4. In brief, if no prisoners had been found when the ship was 
boarded, the Norwegian Government would have had an excellent 
ground for complaint. The prisoners, however, having been found, 
His Majesty's Government considered that they had every right to 
complain that the search carried out had been perfunctory. 
5. The legal question, however, appeared to me of less im-
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portance than the fact that three or four hundred British subjects 
had been kept for many weeks in conditions in which no decent 
person would have kept a dog. The fact that the Norwegian Gov-
ernment did not find a pretext to detain the ship or even to take 
off the sick among the prisoners appeared to His Majesty's Govern-
ment to give them good cause for complaint against the Norwegian 
Government. In reply to an enquiry, I informed the Minister that 
the action taken had been with the full assent of His Majesty's 
Government. In view of the urgency, prior notification to the Nor~ 
wegian Government had not been possible. His Majesty's Govern-
ment did not deny that Norwegian territorial waters had tech-
nically been infringed. They felt, however, that the case against 
the German authorities was so overwhelming that they were 
justified in pressing that the ship should be interned. 
6. The Norwegian Minister stated that he had no information 
regarding the search at Bergen, but that he would inform his 
Government at once of what I had said and invite replies to the 
various questions asked. 
7. I then turned to the note which the Minister had handed 
to me.1 I observed that I took note of his Government's protest 
and their reservation of rights, and would furnish a detailed reply 
as soon as possible. I observed, however, that the Norwegian 
Government would surely not seriously expect His Majesty's Gov-
ernment to return the prisoners; to which the Minister replied 
that this was indeed their intention, as the only means of restoring 
the case to a legal basis. 
Foreign Office, 
17th February, 19.40. 
No.2 
Monsieur Colhan to Viscount 1-Ialif ax 
My Lord, 
Royal Norwegian Legation, 
London, 17th February, 1940. 
On the 16th February, 1940, in the afternoon the German 
steamer Altmark was in Norwegian territorial waters, escorted 
by a Norwegian torpedo-boat. At 4 :30 p.m. two British destroyers 
fired shots of warning to stop the Altmark in the neighborhood of 
the Foksteinene. The Norwegian torpedo-boat protested against 
1 Docum~nt NQ. 2! 
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this. The Altmark went in the Jossingfjord, and the destroyers 
followed and remained at the entrance of the Fjord. The Nor-
wegian torpedo-boat once more protested, and the English force, 
which was then increased to one cruiser and five destroyers moved 
outside the three nautical miles limit. 2 Some time later a destroyer 
again entered Norwegian territorial waters and went close by land 
and used searchlight. At 11 p.m. the English cruiser moved into 
the Fjord and boarded the Altmark. A struggle followed, and it is 
reported that several Germans were killed and wounded. It is 
stated that about 400 British subjects on the Altmark were taken 
on board the British ship which thereafter went out. 
The Norwegian guard-ships consisted of two small tor pedo-
boats, and they could in face of the overwhelming British force 
do nothing but protest with energy. 
I have been instructed immediately to bring this to the Br itish 
Government's notice and to lodge a serious protest against this 
grave violation of Norwegian territorial waters, which has caused 
s'trong indignation, as it took place in the interior of a Norwegian 
Fjord, and thus cannot be due to any mistake or difference of 
opinion with regard to the limit of the territorial waters. 
The Norwegian Government must demand that the British Navy 
be instructed in future to respect Norwegian Sovereignty. 
2 The following is a translation of a note regarding Norwegian neutrality 
which was addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Oslo by the Royal Nor-
wegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 4th September, 1939. 
"Sir, 
I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of the Royal Proclan1a tion 
of the 3rd inst. on Norway's neutrality in the war between Great Britain and 
France on the one side, and Germany on the other. 
I have also the honour to inform you that it has been laid down by Royal 
Resolution of the 3rd inst. that-
' (1) In the war which has broken out between foreign Powers, Norway 
will maintain complete neutrality. The rules and regulations concern-
ing neutrality which are in force (see the Royal Proclamation of 13th 
May, 1938) will not be applied outside a distance of three nautical 
miles from the coast. 
(2) In every other respect the regulations regarding territorial water s, 
hitherto in force, remain valid.' 
This decision has been taken in order to avoid the difficulties which might 
arise in consequence of doubt as to the extent of territorial waters. The deci-
sion is in conformity with the practice followed in the Great European War, 
1914-18. 
In requesting you to inform your Government of the above, I beg you to 
accept the assurance of my highest consideration. 
(Sd.) HALVDAN KoHT." 
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The Norwegian Government expect of the British Government 
that they will hand the prisoners over to the Norwegian Govern-
ment and make due compensation and reparation. 
I have, &c. 
( Sd.) ERIK COLBAN. 
No. 3 
Monsieur Colhan to Viscount Halifax 
My Lord, 
Royal N orwegia11 Legation, 
London, 24th February, 1940. 
I have had the honour to give you to-day 3 verbal information 
in answer to certain questions raised by you in the Altmark case, 
and my Government hope thereby to have contributed to the 
establishment of the real facts of the case and to have made clear 
the view of the Norwegian Government on the matter. 
My Government hope that the British Government, after what 
has thus been stated, will feel themselves convinced that the Nor-
wegian Government have acted in this case in strict accordance 
with International Law. 
If, however, the British Government should maintain their view, 
the Norwegian Government would propose that the difference of 
opinion between the two governments be submitted to arbitration, 
in such a manner as might be laid down in a special agreement. 
No. 4 
Aide-Memoire 
I have, &c. 
(Sd.) ERIK COLBAN 
(Left with Viscount Halifax by Monsieur Colban on 
24 February 1940) 
Royal Norwegian Legation. 
The Altmark was visited by a Norwegian torpedo-boat in Nor-
wegian territorial waters off Kristiansund the 14th February last. 
It was then declared that the ship was on her way from a'n 
American port (Port Arthur, Texas), to Germany and armed 
with small anti-aircraft guns for her own defence, which guns 
3 Document No. 4 
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had been dismantled before arrival in the territorial waters. She 
carried "Reichsdienstflagge" as a sign of her belonging to the 
German State. In Sognesj oen the vessel was hailed by a torpedo-
boat and questions were asked, amongst these, whether persons 
were on board, who belonged to the armed forces of a belligerent 
country, or sailors domiciliated in or citizens of a belligerent 
country. The answer was that no such person was on board. When 
the Altmark was later on hailed by another Norwegian naval 
vessel north of Bergen, the captain of the Altmark refused his ship 
to be searched. As the ship was an auxiliary naval vessel and thus 
assimilated to a war vessel in respect of immunity, the Nor-
wegian authorities had, in International Law, no power to proceed 
to further inquires, nor to prevent the continuation of the voyage 
in Norwegian territorial waters. 
The Altmark did not call at Bergen or at any other Norwegian 
port or anchorage, as seems to have been, erroneously, supposed. 
No question of a 24 hours limit thus arises. Neither The Hague 
Convention nor the Norwegian Neutrality Rules prescribe any 
limited time in case of passage. 
As the Altmark did not call at a Norwegian port, the Norwegian 
Government had not had to decide what ought to have been done 
with the ship or the prisoners, if that had been the case. Generally, 
it can only be said that the Norwegian Government would also in 
such a case have done their best to fulfill all their international 
obligations. 
The British Government have themselves emphasized the right 
of vessels of war to passage in neutral territorial waters. Refer-
ence to this right was made in the memorandum presented to the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister by the British Minister in Oslo on 
the 23rd of May, 1939, to which memorandum the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister replied on the 2nd September, 1939. 
The Norwegian Government are desirous to underline that it 
was their duty in this case correctly to observe the rules of Inter-
national Law to both sides. And the Norwegian Government do 
not have a'ny doubt as to the meaning of these rules. 
As to the assertion that the British prisoners have been badly 
treated, and that Norway ought to have considered the situation 
from the humanitarian point of view, the Norwegian Government 
would like to say that they can understand the feelings of the 
· Brtish Government at the thought that British prisoners were on 
board the Altmark. The Norwegian Government, however, con-
sider that a neutral state cannot interfere between Belligerent 
36 
Powers or in their disputes without definite authority for so doing 
in a treaty or in some recognised rule of International Law. 
No. 5 
"Oral Communication" Made hy Monsieur Colhan on 
8th March 1940 
At the enquiry which has been made in Norway in the Alt1nark -
case, the following has been established:-
On the 16th of February at 5 o'clock p.m., the Commander of 
the Cossack informed the Commander of the Norwegian torpedo-
boat K iel l that he was instructed by the British Admiralty to 
liberate 400 British prisoners on board the Altmark. The Com-
mander of the !{jell declared that he had no knowledge of the 
presence of prisoners on board, and that his instructions were to 
the effect that he should prevent violation of Norway's neutrality. 
The Commander of the Cossack proposed inspection on the spot. 
The Commander of the Kiell declined this and asked the British 
Commander to leave Norwegian territorial waters at once. 
At 11 p.m. on the same day, when the Cossack entered the 
J ossingfj ord, her Commander replied to the Norwegian protest 
that he had instructions from the British Government to liberate 
the prisoners he had mentioned in the afternoon. 
Apart from what is stated above, no request for joint Nor-
wegian-British inspection was made, and no other declaration 
was made on the Norwegian side as to the presence of prisoners 
on board. 
The Altmark used her wireless station illegally on the 15th 
February at 1 :23 p.m. in a telegram to the German Legation in 
Oslo. The telegram was stopped by the Norwegian authorities, and 
the captain of the Altmark was at once informed that he had 
violated the r egulations in force. He apologised. 
No. 6 
Viscount Halifax to Monsieur Colhan 4 
Foreign Office, 15th March, 1940 
Your Excellency, 
On the 17th February last, I requested your Excellency to call 
upon me in order that I might give the Norwegian Government 
4 This note reached Oslo shortly before the Gern1an invasion of Norway 
and, in that circumstance, the Norwegian Government were not in a position 
to send a reply. 
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certain facts which had already come to the know ledge of His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in connexion with 
the liberation of the British prisoners from the German naval 
auxiliary vessel Altmark. 
At that interview I explained the general attitude of His 
Majesty's Government to the case as then known to them, and 
I requested certain information as to the action taken by the 
Norwegian Government and the results of that action. Your Excel-
lency was good enough to undertake to obtain replies to the 
various questions which I had put to you, and at the same time 
handed me your note of the 17th February, in which the Nor-
wegian Government lodged a serious protest against the grave 
violation of Norwegian territorial waters which they considered 
to have occurred, and stated that they expected His Majesty's 
Government to hand the British prisoners over to the Norwegian 
Government and make due compensation and reparation. 
On the 24th February I had the honour to have a further inter-
view with you, at which you were so good as to convey to me the 
replies of your Government to the questions which I had put to 
you on the 17th and handed to me your note No. 79 of the 24th 
February, which stated that, in the light of the information given 
in reply to my questions, the Norwegian Government hoped that 
His Majesty's Government would feel convinced that the Nor-
wegian Government had acted in this case in strict accordance 
with international law, but that if His Majesty's Government 
should maintain their view, the Norwegian Government would 
propose that the difference of opinion between the two Govern-
ments should be submitted to arbitration. I now desire to make 
the following observations on your Excellency's notes and on the 
case in general. 
2. The facts of the case as now known to His Majesty's Gov-
ernment, both from their own information and from the various 
statements made by the Norwegian Government, are as follows. 
The Altmark, a ship of about 18,000 tons gross, with a speed of 
approximately 25 knots, is a German naval auxiliary vessel. She 
appears in the 1939, official list of "Die Schiffe· der deutschen 
Kriegsmarine," where she is described as a supply ship 
("Trosschiff"). There is no doubt that she should be treated in 
the same manner as a warship, and indeed the German official 
wireless, despite the fact that it at first described her as an 
. "innocent merchant vessel," subsequently admitted that she was 
being used as a naval auxiliary vessel. 
3. The Altmark had been for a period of many weeks in 
·attendance on the German armoured ship Admiral Graf Spee 
38 
during the later's operations in the Atlantic and elsewhere, and 
is known to have fuelled her at various times during that period. 
In particular, the crews of a considerable number of British mer-
chant ships sunk by the Adn~iral Graf Spee were placed by her 
Commanding Officer on board the Altmark, and at the time of the 
destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee the number of these prison-
ers amounted to about 300. After the destruction of the Admiral 
Graf Spee, the Altmark left the South Atlantic and endeavoured 
to return to Germany, the object of her voyage being clearly to -
complete the operation, which began with the capture of the 
prisoners in question, by their removal to Germany as prisoners 
of war. The prisoners were in charge of an armed guard composed 
of seamen from the Admiral Graf Spee. The British naval au-
thorities, who were aware of the Altmark's intended return to 
Germany, had made the necessary dispositions to intercept her if 
she came through the North Sea. 
4. The Altn~ark, however, did not adopt this, the natural and 
ordinary route for a ship returning to a German port from the 
Atlantic. She entered Norwegian territorial waters on the 14th 
February at some point off the Trondhj em Fjord, and proceeded 
through those waters in a southerly direction. A little further 
south she was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo-boat, whose Com-
mander made a request to inspect the ship. It appears that as the 
Altmark was regarded as a warship and carried the German State 
flag, the Norwegian officers considered that the only thing he was 
entitled to do was to ascertain that the ship really was what she 
purported to be. He examined her papers, which are stated to have 
been in order, and was informed that the ship was on her way 
from Po.rt Arthur, Texas, to Germany and that she carried anti-
aircraft guns for her own defence. 
The Altmark proceeded on her way, but further south at 
Sognesj oen she was hailed by another Norwegian torpedo-boat 
and was asked whether there were any persons on board who 
belonged to the armed forces of a belligerent country, or sailors 
domiciled in, or citizens of, a belligerent country. The answer was 
that no such person was on board. The ship was again allowed to 
proceed, but it appears that the Admiral Commanding at Bergen 
was not satisfied about her, and on the 15th February, when the 
Altmark was about 100 miles from Bergen, a Norwegian guard ' 
ship stopped her and asked to inspect her. This the Altmark's 
captain refused to allow, and the request was dropped. It was 
then discovered that the Altmark had been using her wireless 
in Norwegian territorial waters in contravention of the Norwegian 
neutrality regulations, and a complaint of this was made by the , 
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Norwegian authorities; the captain made an apology, declaring 
that he was unacquainted with this prohibition, and the matter 
vvas apparently not pursued further. 
5. The Norwegian Government state that the Altmark did not 
. call at Bergen or any other Norwegian port, and His Majesty's 
Government naturally accept this statement. There is, however, 
no doubt that she passed through the "Bergen defended area," a 
zone about 20 miles long from north to south, -vvhich constitutes 
one of the Norwegian "ports et espaces maritimes qui auront ete 
declares ports de guerre" which belligerent warships are forbidden 
to enter under Article 2 of the Norwegian Neutrality Regulations. 
Inasmuch as such a violation of their Regulations obviously could 
not have escaped the vigilance of the Norwegian authorities, His 
Majesty's Government assume that special permission was given 
by them to the Altmark to pass through the area in question, 
although the Regulations make no provision for any exceptions to 
this prohibition. As to the grounds on which such permission was 
requested and the reasons which led the Norwegia'n Government 
to grant it, His Majesty's Government have no information; but 
they have no doubt as to the motives which led the ship to desire 
to pass through the area, and I shall return to this point later. 
6. The Altmark continued on her voyage south through Nor-
wegian territorial waters, apparently escorted by a Norwegian 
torpedo-boat, and on the 16th February she was finally encountered 
by H.M.S. Cossack in the Jossingfjord in the circumstances with 
which the Norwegian Government are acquainted. The Command-
ing Officer of H.M.S. Cossack had been instructed by the British 
Admiralty to propose to the Commander of the Norwegian tor-
pedo-boat that a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard should be placed 
on board the Altmark a'nd a joint Anglo-Norwegian escort pro-
vided to accompany her to Bergen in order that the matter might 
be properly investigated there by the Norwegian authorities. The 
Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Cossack has reported that he 
carried out these instructions, but that his proposal was declined 
by the Norwegian Commander in accordance, as he stated, with 
the instructions of his Government. The Commanding Officer of 
H.M.S. Cossack then invited the Norwegian Commander to accom-
pany the British boarding party during their impending search of 
the Altm.ark, but he declined to do so. 
Your Excellency has informed me that, according to the in-
.formation in possession of your Government, the Commanding 
Officer of H.M.S. Cossack proposed inspection on the spot but that, 
apart from this, no request for joint Norwegian-British inspection 
was made. It is possible that some confusion may have arisen be-
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tween inspection at Bergen and inspection on the spot, but His 
Majesty's Government have no doubt, in view of the specific in-
structions which they had issued, and the reports which they had 
received, that both proposals were, in fact, made by the Command-
ing Officer of H.M.S. Cossack. It is in any case clear, on your Ex-
cellency's statement, that an offer of joint inspection was made 
and was declined by the Norwegian Commander. 
The Altmark was then boarded and the British prisoners re-
leased and taken on board H.M.S. Cossack. The Altn~ark had-
previously attempted to ram H.M.S. Cossack and drive her ashore 
and resistance was offered to the boarding party by the German 
armed guard, the first shot being fired at a British warrant officer, 
who was wounded by it. There was some loss of life on the German 
side, but no injury to Norwegian life or property took place. I 
desire to add that at that point the Altmark had passed through 
some 400 miles of Norwegian territorial waters from the point 
at which she entered them, and the total length of those waters 
which she would in all probability have traversed if her voyage 
had not been interrupted is over 600 miles. 
7. Such being the circumstances of the case, His Majesty's Gov-
ernment consider that it was the duty of the Norwegian Govern-
ment, before allowing the Altmark to continue her voyage through 
Norwegian territorial waters, and particularly before granting her 
permission to pass through the "Bergen defended area," to ascer-
tain by means of a proper investigation not only the status of the 
ship but also the nature and object of her voyage and of the use 
to which she was putting those waters. It is clear that the Nor-
wegian Government failed to do so. On at least three occasions the 
Altmark was stopped by a Norwegian warship and there was 
ample opportunity for such an investigation, but none was made, 
and the proposals for investigation made by H.M.S. Cossack were 
refused. In consequence, the Norwegian Government were, accord-
ing to their own statement, unaware throughout of the material 
fact that the Altmark had about 300 British prisoners on board. 
In this connexion His Majesty's Government attach particular 
importance to the incident at Sognesjoen, when a Norwegian 
torpedo-boat specifically enquired whether the Altmark had on 
board any sailors who were citizens of a belligerent country, and 
was answered in the negative. This indicates that the Commander 
of the Norwegian torpedo-boat had some suspicions as to the true 
position; but the really important consideration is that the fact 
of the Commander of the Altmark having found it necessary to 
reply to the enquiry by a barefaced lie shows that he at any rate 
considered the presence of the British prisoners on board to be so 
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material a circumstance that it was essential to keep it from 
coming to the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities, even at 
the sacrifice of his personal honour. He obviously felt that if this 
circumstance came to the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities, 
his purpose in using the protection of hundreds of miles of Nor-
wegian territorial waters to ensure the safe conveyance of the 
prisoners to Germany would be frustrated. It is, in fact, clear that 
both the Norwegian Commander and the German Commander 
regarded the presence or absence of prisoners as a relevant cir-
cumstance. The fact that the question was asked and that it was 
untruthfully answered seems to indicate that both Commanders 
took the same view as His Majesty's Government, indicated in 
paragraphs 14 to 16 of this note, of the application of Article 10 
of The Hague Convention No. XIII,5 to the use being made by the 
Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters. 
The attempts of the Norwegian officers to make a proper in-
vestigation of the case were met by refusals to allow the ship to be 
examined, backed by a deliberate lie, and no proper investigation, 
which would have_ immediately revealed the true situation, took 
place at all. 
8. The Norwegian Government seem to regard this result as 
inevitable. They appear to take the view that once the Altmark 
had been acknowledged as bearing the character of a warship, they 
had no right to make any investigation of the nature and object 
of her voyage and use of Norwegian waters, and were only entitled 
to look at her papers. His Majesty's Government cannot accept 
any such view. If a belligerent warship proposes to make use of 
neutral ports or territorial waters, the neutral Government has 
not only the right but a definite obligation to make such investiga-
tion as may be required in order to satisfy itself that the use in 
question is proper and permissible under international law; and if 
the warship declines to submit to such investigation, such a refusal 
(which inevitably suggests that the vessel's proceedings and pur-
pose would not stand investigation) should be met by at least a 
refusal to allow her to continue to use the shelter of neutrality for 
her purpose. Any other view would open the door to wholesale 
infractions of neutral rights and obligations. While a neutral State 
cannot be expected to do more than employ the means at its dis-
f posal for the purpose of such investigation, in this case, those 
means, although amply sufficient, were not in fact employed. His 
1 Majesty's Government cannot but conclude that the action of the 
Norwegian Government in allowing their attempts at investiga-
5 
"Miscellaneous No. 6 (1908) ," Col. 4175. 
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tion to be frustrated as they were, and permitting the Altmark to 
proceed as she did, constituted a failure to comply with the 
obligations of neutrality. 
9. There are, moreover, two particular incidents to which His 
Majesty's Government feel bound to call attention. The first is the 
discovery that the Altmark had been violating the Norwegian 
Regulations by using her wireless in Norwegian waters. His 
Majesty's Government consider that when this discovery had been 
made, it was incumbent upon the Norwegian authorities at least to_ 
ascertain the nature of the use which the Altmark had been 
making of her wireless, since the nature of the communications 
might well have been such as to constitute not merely a breach 
of the Norwegian Regulations forbidding any transmission at all, 
but a serious infringement of neutrality which would have called 
for appropriate action by the Norwegian Government. But no 
such investigation was made, and the matter was regarded as dis- 1 
posed of by the apology made by the Altrnark's Commander.6 
10. The second incident is the permission which must be pre-
sumed to have been given to the Altmark to pass through the 
"Bergen defended area." There can be no doubt that the request 
was made because, while it is possible to avoid the area without 
leaving territorial waters, the passage in question is, in certain 
conditions, a dangerous one, and the Altmark might have been · 
obliged to leave territorial waters and enter the open sea, in 
which case she would have been exposed to attack by British 
forces. It was in order to avoid any such possibility that the 
Altmark desired to pass through an area which is prohibited by 
the Norwegian Regulations to belligerent warships, and His 
6 It has since been learned that the telegram addressed to the German 
Legation in Oslo was at once intercepted by the Norwgian authorities, who 
therefore knew its contents. It was worded as follows:-
"W erde soeben 1300 Uhr zum zweiten Male vom N orwegischen 
Zerstorer (n) zum Stoppen aufgefordert, nachdem bereits in drei 
Fallen N orwegischen Offizieren aile erbetene Auskunft erteilt 
worden ist. Muss gegen diese meines Erachtens neutralitatswidrige 
wiederholte Verzogerung energischen Protest erheben." 
[Translation] 
"Have just been ordered to stop for the second time, at 1300 hours, 
by a Norwegian destroyer, after Norwegian officers already on three 
occasions have been given all the information they requested. Must 
protest energetically against this repeated delay which in my opinion 
is a breach of neutrality." 
This is the telegram which was intercepted by the Norwegian authorities- ·. 
see last paragraph of Docu1nent No. 5. 
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Majesty's Government cannot but regard the action of the Nor-
wegian Government in granting permission as singularly difficult 
to justify in the circumstances. 
11. For the above reasons His Majesty's Government co·nsider 
that, irrespective of the question whether the nature and object of 
the Alhnark's voyage through Norwegian territorial waters were 
permissible, the fact that the Norwegian authorities permitted, 
and, indeed, went out of their way to facilitate, that voyage with-
out making any proper enquiry into its nature and object con-
stituted a definite failure on their part to comply with the obliga-
tions of neutrality. It had become plain that, so far as the Nor-
wegian Government were concerned, the Altmark would be allowed 
to effect her object of conveying the British prisoners to Germany 
through the shelter of Norwegian territorial waters, and His 
Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that in the circum-
stances they were fully justified in taking action to prevent that 
result being achieved, and that they would, indeed, have failed 
in their duty if they had not done so. I desire to emphasize that 
the action of His l\1aj esty's ships was confined to the minimum 
necessary to secure the release of the prisoners ; despite the 
resistance offered, no attempt was made to capture or destroy the 
Altmark, or to make prisoners of the armed guard or crew. 
12. Quite apart from the questions whether the Norwegian 
Government exercised toward the Altmark the vigilance which was 
properly required of them as neutrals, His Majesty's Government 
desire to deal fully with other aspects of the case. It will be 
recalled that His Excellency the Norwegian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs explained in the Storting on the 19th February that, in the 
vievv of the Norwegian Government, the Altmark in any case had 
the right to pass through Norwegian territorial waters; and he 
also stated that "there is nothing in international law prohibiting 
a belligerent from conveying prisoners through neutral territory 
if the passage itself is legal"; and I assume, therefore, that this 
represents the attitude of the Norwegian Government on the 
question of international law involved. 
13. To take the latter statement first, and assuming that the 
word ''territory" is to be regarded as meaning "territorial waters" 
and not as including land, His Majesty's Government have never 
contended, and do not now contend, that in all circumstances the 
presence of prisoners on board a belligerent warship, which is 
legitimately visiting neutral jurisdiction, imposes on the ·neutral 
the duty of taking action such as the release of the prisoners~ 
If a belligerent warship, paying a legitimate visit of not more than 
24 hours to a neutral port, has prisoners on board, this does not 
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in itself impose any obligation upon the neutral Government. If, 
however, the warship requires special facilities in the neutral port, 
such as repairs which cannot be executed within 24 hours, different 
considerations arise, as is shown by the fact that, after the arrival 
of the Admiral Graf Spee, at Montevideo, the Uruguayan Govern-
ment effected the release of the prisoners (shipmates of those in 
the Altmark) who were o·n board her. The question is one which 
must depend on the facts of the particular case, or, in the words 
of Professor Koht, on the question whether "the passage itself is 
legal." 
14. The Norwegian Government contend that the passage of I 
the Alt1nark, in the circumstances stated above, through hundreds 
of miles of Norwegian territorial waters was a legitimate opera-
tion which they were bound to allow. They consider, in fact, that 
it was an instance of "the mere passage" ("le simple passage") ;1 
through neutral territorial waters which, under Article 10 of The : 
Hague Convention XIII, does not compromise the neutrality of 
the country concerned. From this view His Majesty's Government ~ 
must emphatically dissent. They have frequently in the past in- · 
sisted on the "right of innocent passage," and they were them- · 
selves the authors, at The Hague Conference of 1907, of the 
proposal which ultimately took the form of Article 10. But it is . 
an essential element of innocent passage that it should be innocent~ ~ 
and their attitude on this point was expressed by Sir Ernest Satow, 
the first British delegate at The Hague Conference, when he spoke 
of "la liberte de traverser en temps de guerre comme en temps de 
paix les eaux territoriales." ('Innocent passage," which it was the 
object of Article 10 to allow, means passage through such ter-
ritorial waters as would form part of a ship's normal course from 
the point of departure to her destination, and in particular through 
such territorial waters as form part of straits which provide access 
from one area of the sea to another. It is in this sense that His 
Majesty's Government have always understood and upheld the 
"right of innocent passage," and it is in this sense that it is 
recognised in international law. To regard it otherwise would I 
clearly be to encourage the abuse of neutral jurisdiction. His · 
Majesty's Government accordingly consider that for the reasons ; 
given in paragraph 8 above, it is the duty of a neutral, before · 
exercising the liberty which Article 10 allows to permit "le simple ; 
passage," to satisfy itself that the passage is in fact of such a ; 
nature as to be permissible u·nder that Article. 
15. But what was the nature and object of the Altmark's ·' 
passage through Norwegian territorial waters? She was on her : 
way from the South Atlantic to Germany by the nor th-about . 
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route, and the object of her journey and of her passage through 
Norwegian waters was to complete with impunity the belligerent 
operation, which began with the capture of the British seamen 
and was continued with their conveyance across the Atlantic, by 
depositing them in Germany as prisoners of war. She had entered 
Norwegian territorial waters on the 14th February at a point off 
the Trondhjem Fjord, and on the 16th February she had proceeded 
through those waters for about 400 miles, and was in all prob-
ability proposing to continue her passage through those waters 
until she reached their southerly limit, more than 200 miles 
further on. The Norwegian Government will not suggest that the 
circuitous route taken by the Altmark bears any relation whatever 
to the course normally adopted by shipping proceeding from the 
Atlantic north-about to Germany. The sole and the admitted 
object with which the Altmark took this highly remarkable course 
was to conclude her warlike operations under the protection of 
Norwegian neutrality for a distance of several hundred miles and 
a period of more than three days, so as to escape the fate which 
awaited her on the high seas at the hands of the British Fleet; 
and the importance which she attached to not leaving for one 
moment the shelter of those waters is illustrated by the incident 
of her passage through the Bergen defended area. 
16. His Majesty's Government most emphatically insist that 
such a voyage cannot be regarded as one which the Altmark was 
entitled to make, or the Norwegian Government bound to permit, 
as being an instance of the right of innocent passage which is 
recognised by international law and permitted under the title of 
"le simple passage" by Article 10 of The Hague Convention XIII. 
It could not even be accurately described as an abuse of that right 
to which it bears no relation whatever. It involves a claim by 
Germany (who has not scrupled to violate Norwegian neutrality 
when it suited her purpose to do so) to utilise the entire length of 
Norwegian territorial waters as and when she pleases, not in the 
ordinary course of navigation, but as a sort of protected corridor 
within the shelter of which her warships can complete, under the 
protection of Norwegian neutrality, the military operations in 
which they may have been engaged. This is not a claim which 
Germany is entitled to make or Norway to concede. 
17. Your Excellency stated to me that as the Altmark did not 
call at Bergen or at any other Norwegian port or anchorage, no 
question of a 24 hours' limit arises. This as it stands cannot be 
regarded as a correct statement of the law, since Article 12 of 
The Hague Convention XIII expressly for bids belligerent warships 
~~de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales" 
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of a neutral Power for more than 24 hours. His Majesty's Govern-
ment regard the question of passage through territorial waters as 
governed by Article 10 of the Convention and not by Article 12, 
and, in their view, the time limit of passage is not the fixed one 
of 24 hours prescribed by the latter Article but that which results 
from the very nature of "innocent passage" which I have described 
in paragraph 14 of the present Note; but Article 12 is at any rate 
a refutation of the contention that no time limit exists if the ship 
does not enter a port or anchorage, and the existence of this gen..: 
eral prohibition, applicable to both ports and territorial waters, 
reinforces the view which His Majesty's Government hold as to 
the nature of the passage which is permitted by Article 10. 
I I 
18. In this connexion there is one point to which I feel it neces- · 
sary to refer. On the 19th February His Excellency the Norwegian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in the course of i 
which he said that in the summer of 1939 His Majesty's Govern-
ment, in making certain enquiries of the Norwegian Government 
as to the Neutrality Regulations which they had adopted, had 
emphasized "that warships must have the right to sail in Nor-
wegian territorial waters as long as they desired and without 
regard to the twenty-four hours' limit." His Majesty's Govern-
ment are constrained to observe that there is no foundation for 
this statement. What His Majesty's Government did say, in their 
memorandum of 23rd May, 1939, was that "they have always 
maintained, and must continue to maintain, the existence of such 
a right of entry (i.e., into neutral territorial waters) for pur-
poses of innocent passage." The object of this observation (which 
was correctly quoted in the statement issued by the Norwegian 
Foreign Department on the 21st February) was, of course, to 
maintain the principle of the right of innocent passage to which 
His Majesty's Government have always attached importance, and 
on which His Majesty's Government felt that some doubt might 
possibly be cast by certain provisions of the Norwegian Regula-
tions. I readily accept the statement which your Excellency made 
to me on the 24th February, that Professor l(oht's statement was 
due to his having relied upon his recollection of the contents of 
His Majesty's Government's memorandum; but as the statement, 
which was publicly attributed to His Majesty's Government, was 
never made by them, and never could have been made by them, 
since it would have been in direct contradiction of their views as 
to the right of innocent passage, I think it desirable that the true 1 
facts should be placed on record. 
19. His Majesty's Government must, therefore, conclude that 
the use made by the Altmark of Norwegian territorial waters was 
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not a legitimate exercise of the right of innocent passage, and 
ought not to have been permitted by the Norwegian Government; 
and that the action of the Norwegian Government in permit-
ting, and, indeed, facilitating, the Altmark's operations, and in 
making no proper enquiry as to the nature and object of those 
operations, constituted a failure to observe the obligations of 
neutrality. In the light of the facts and the above considerations, 
His Majesty's Government feel that they were fully justified in 
taking the action which in the circumstances they felt compelled 
to take. I desire to add that while in the above observations I have 
made no reference to the considerations arising from Norway's 
membership of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government 
reserve their position in this respect. 
20. But I do not wish, particularly in view of the friendly 
relations which have existed for so long between our two sea-
faring nations, to conclude upon this note. In your communication 
of the 24th February your Excellency suggested that the difference 
of opinion between the two Governments might be submitted to 
arbitration. Should the Norwegian Government feel it necessary 
to persist in this suggestion, His Majesty's Government would 
have several observations to make which appear to them to be 
extremely pertinent. But I venture to hope that, in view of the 
very full explanation which I have now given of the attitude of 
His Majesty's Government, the Norwegian Government will not 
find it necessary to press this suggestion further. I have thought 
it only proper to state the reasons which lead His Majesty's Gov-
ernment to consider that they have just cause of complaint against 
the Norwegian Government; but I fully recognise that your Excel-
lency's Government found themselves in a difficult position, and I 
readily acknowledge, in particular, that they could not have been 
expected to assume that legitimate enquiries made on their behalf 
would have been met by shameless mendacity on the part of the 
German officer concerned. His Majesty's Government have warmly 
appreciated the fact that the Norwegian Government should have 
expressed understanding of the feelings of His Majesty's Govern-
ment at the thought that British prisoners were ·on board the 
Altmark; and His Majesty's Government for their part are very 
willing to place on record their regret that they should have had 
no option but to adopt a course which, although in their opinion 
fully justified by the circumstances, admittedly involved taking 
action in Norwegian territorial waters. 
21. This being so, I venture to hope that the Norwegian Govern-
ment, even if they are unable to accept all the contentions which 
I have put forward, will at any rate be ·not unwilling to recognise 
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that this case constitutes a clash not of right and wrong but of 
two rights; and that they 'vill feel able to agree that, each party 
having now expressed its point of view, the matter can be allowed 
to rest where it is without disturbing the traditionally friendly 
relations between our two countries. 
I have, &c. 
(Sd.) HALIFAX 
